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LITIGATION FUNDING VERSUS
LIABILITY INSURANCE:
WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?
Charles Silver*
INTRODUCTION
Having studied insurance defense arrangements for years, I was
mystified by the strenuous opposition mounted in certain quarters to
third-party litigation funding.  For it seemed to me that liability insur-
ance, which ordinarily requires insurers to bear both the cost of de-
fending claims and the burden of paying them, was subject to every
complaint lodged against third-party funding.  Both encourage law-
suits, influence settlement terms, have payers intermeddling in litiga-
tion, etc.  Yet, in the United States insurers have covered litigation
risks for over a century, and no one proposes getting rid of them.  To
the contrary, some writers, including me, worry that certain actors
have too little insurance and should perhaps be required to purchase
more.1  Yet, if liability insurance and third-party funding are objec-
tionable on the same grounds, why should we want more of one and
less of the other?
In this Article, I make good on the claim that the major objections
to third-party funding have analogues applicable to liability coverage.
* Roy W. and Eugenia C. McDonald Endowed Chair in Civil Procedure, School of Law,
University of Texas at Austin.  E-mail: csilver@law.utexas.edu.  I am grateful to Ronen
Avraham, Michelle DeStefano, Andrew Gold, and Anthony Sebok for comments and sugges-
tions.  I sometimes serve as a consultant on litigation matters that may involve issues like those
discussed herein.
1. Lynn LoPucki and James J. White famously debated this issue in the context of commercial
insurance. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996); James J. White,
Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki’s The Death of Liability, 107 YALE
L.J. 1363 (1998); Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413
(1998).  In the context of medical malpractice, my research group documented a sizeable decline
in the real amount of professional liability insurance carried by Texas doctors with closed claims,
the rarity with which claimants recover more than the policy limits, and a significant shortfall in
compensation for plaintiffs who won jury verdicts. See Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, Ber-
nard Black, David A. Hyman & William M. Sage, Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice
Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990–2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S9 (2007); see also
David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver & William M. Sage, Do De-
fendants Pay What Juries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases,
1988–2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3 (2007).  A plausible implication of this work is that
states should enact minimum insurance requirements for health care providers.
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I also explain why the objections have not led us to prohibit carriers
from selling insurance, and why third-party funding should survive
them as well.  When carrying out this project, I focus on contracts be-
tween funders and claimants, rather than between funders and law-
yers.  The former resemble liability insurance arrangements more
nearly than the latter, which are substitutes for accumulated wealth,
bank loans, and other sources lawyers have traditionally used to fi-
nance cases.
I begin by describing the core similarity between liability insurance
and third-party litigation funding: the transfer of risks associated with
civil litigation.  By purchasing insurance, a potential defendant trades
a fixed loss in the present for a carrier’s willingness to bear an uncer-
tain loss in the future.  Third-party litigation funding is the mirror im-
age of this arrangement.  A plaintiff accepts a fixed gain today in
return for giving a funder a share of a gamble that may or may not pay
off.  The claim that liability insurance should be permitted while third-
party funding is barred boils down to the assertion that it should be
lawful to trade in potential litigation-related losses but not in potential
litigation-related gains.  I do not see how this proposition can be main-
tained.  The remaining Parts of this Article address the major objec-
tions raised against third-party funding and explore their applicability
to liability insurers.
II. LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THIRD-PARTY
FUNDING COMPARED
Liability insurance and third-party litigation funding are isomorphs.
They evolved independently but have similar structures and func-
tions.2  In the United States, liability insurance emerged first.  Carriers
have been bearing policyholders’ tort-related risks since the late
1800s,3 and the expansion of liability coverage in the twentieth cen-
tury fueled a corresponding and causally dependent growth in the
flow of compensation through civil justice systems.4
2. Many have observed the similarity between third-party funding and liability insurance. See,
e.g., Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or
Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2838–40 (2012) (citing sources); Susan Lorde Martin,
Leveling the Playing Field, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elses-lawsuit/leveling-the-playing-field.
3. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 COR-
NELL L. REV. 313, 314 & n.6 (1990) (noting that an 1886 employers’ liability insurance policy was
the first instance of liability insurance in America).
4. The spread of liability coverage and the resulting rise of civil litigation are described in
admirable detail in Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183
(2001).
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Initially, insurers sold true indemnity policies that required them to
reimburse policyholders for losses previously paid.5  These original
policies did not entitle carriers to defend or settle claims.  Over time,
working arrangements changed.  Insurers started indemnifying policy-
holders against liability (as contrasted with losses previously paid),
and primary insurers assumed control of the defense and settlement of
claims.6  They became active litigation managers rather than passive
indemnitors.  They also cut policyholders out of the payment loop.
Today, primary liability carriers normally pay claimants directly in-
stead of reimbursing insureds.
Third-party litigation funders—a label applied to businesses that
provide financial assistance to persons or companies involved as plain-
tiffs in civil lawsuits—appeared recently, and their products are still
evolving as funders work around legal impediments and fine-tune
their business models.7  The approach I take as a model involves the
transfer of a fractional ownership interest in a claim from a plaintiff to
a funder, in return for which the funder pays the plaintiff an agreed
amount, which the plaintiff may use to defray litigation costs or, in
many instances, as she otherwise desires.  Typically, the funder’s re-
turn is tied to the value added or the level of risk incurred.  The
amount recovered may proxy for the value a funder’s contribution
adds. The time needed to obtain a recovery or the level of financial
support extended often proxy for the risk a funder incurs.
Liability insurance and third-party funding arrangements also use
similar structures to accomplish similar goals.  Both increase wealth by
using contracts to transfer litigation risks and costs from parties who
would rather avoid them to businesses that can bear them more easily.
To create risk pools whose results can reliably be predicted, insurers
and funders (at least those operating in the consumer sector) diversify
5. See Randall L. Smith & Fred A. Simpson, Extrinsic Facts & the Eight Corners Rule Under
Texas Law—The World Is Not As Flat As Some Would Have You Believe, 46 S. TEX. L. REV.
463, 505 (2004) (citing James E. Rhodes, The Liability of Insurance Contract, 4 ME. L. REV. 65,
67 (1911)).
6. Id. at 506–07.
7. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is attempting to create insurmountable obstacles for liti-
gation funders by having sympathetic state legislators sponsor bills that would treat funding ar-
rangements as loans subject to consumer finance laws. See 2012 State Legislative Wrap Up,
ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE CONSUMER LEGAL FUNDING (July 10, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://blog.
arclegalfunding.org/2012/07/10/2012-state-legislative-wrap-up/ (reporting that “[m]embers of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the insurance industry and state Chambers of Commerce intro-
duced six pieces of local legislation seeking to ban or severely limit the [consumer legal funding]
industry”).  For an example of proposed legislation that would cripple the industry under the
guise of protecting consumers, see H.B. 1595, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013) (characterizing
consumer legal funding as lending and subjecting it to interest rate limitations).
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their exposure across matters that, they hope, are similar but indepen-
dent.8  To create these pools, both insurers and funders must define
the risks that are transferred.  This is easier for funders than for insur-
ers, who sell many products (car insurance, homeowner’s insurance,
medical professional liability coverage, etc.), each of which covers a
range of liability-producing activities.  Insurance policies contain
many coverage-defining clauses and exclusions not found in funding
contracts, which are limited to specific claims.
Insurers and funders both encounter adverse selection and moral-
hazard problems and must develop means of handling these difficul-
ties.  Adverse selection occurs because parties who are poor risks—for
example, bad drivers and plaintiffs with weak claims—are more likely
to seek help from insurers and funders than those who are good risks.
Parties also possess private information and may misrepresent their
riskiness to obtain better terms.9  Insurers use the underwriting pro-
cess to weed out bad risks and policy limits to restrict their exposure
to them.  Funders use case evaluations, limits on investment size, and
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ willingness to handle claims on contingency to do
the same.10
Moral-hazard problems arise because the risk transfer reduces the
interest a party has in a claim.11  A defendant who cares little how a
lawsuit turns out (because the carrier must pay the freight) may be
unwilling to put much time or effort into the case.  Or the defendant,
8. Many litigation funders appear to be too small to operate risk pools that permit the applica-
tion of the law of large numbers.  This may be because the industry is still in its infancy.  Alterna-
tively, some funders may operate like specialty insurers that cover nondiversifiable risks.  For a
discussion, see STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE
UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 24–26 (2010).
9. See id. at 24.
10. One funder that invests large sums in commercial lawsuits reportedly conducts case evalu-
ations that “averag[e] about 60 to 90 days” in length and cost “$75,000–$100,000 for each screen-
ing.”  Id. at 26 (quoting Ralph Lindeman, Third-Party Investors Offer New Funding Source for
Major Commercial Lawsuits, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Mar. 5, 2010, at 1, 4); see
also Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits
of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 713–14 (2007) (“[L]itigation funding firms review doc-
uments from each case to perform an analysis of the merit of claims.  Firms request documents
such as the client engagement letter, accident reports and medical records from plaintiffs’ attor-
neys to evaluate the claims.  In fact, many of these firms employ attorneys to evaluate the
claims.” (footnotes omitted)).
11. It is helpful to distinguish between two types of moral hazard: primary moral hazard,
which affects an insured’s incentive to exercise reasonable care before a claim arises; and secon-
dary moral hazard, which affects an insured’s incentive to minimize the cost of resolving a claim
or, in the case of a funded plaintiff, to maximize a claim’s value.  Liability insurance generates
both types of moral hazard because insureds purchase coverage before claims arise.  Third-party
funding probably generates only secondary moral hazard, but may conceivably generate primary
moral hazard as it becomes more widely available and potential tort victims develop the expecta-
tion of purchasing it.
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having been freed from other costs and risks, may focus on secondary
effects, such as reputational interests, and may want to minimize them
regardless of the impact on the carrier.  Insurers use early notice
clauses, cooperation requirements, and the threat of withdrawing cov-
erage to motivate defendants.
A funded plaintiff may also be uninterested or may become a risk
seeker if only an unusually large recovery will leave any substantial
amount for the plaintiff after the contingent fee lawyer and the funder
are paid.12  Funders motivate plaintiffs by ensuring that they keep
some skin in the game,13 by staging their financial contributions, and
by piggybacking on plaintiffs’ relationships with attorneys, who have a
fee interest in the recovery and monitor plaintiffs’ participation.14
Of course, insurers and funders sell their contracts to different par-
ties with different needs.  Liability insurers serve potential and actual
defendants in civil litigation—usually the former—by acquiring risks
associated with losses imposed by law.  Third-party funders serve po-
tential and actual plaintiffs—usually the latter—by acquiring risks at-
tached to litigation-related gains.  Although both presumably use
contracts to maximize the joint welfare of themselves and the parties
they work with, the manner in which the contracts operate reflects the
opposition of the parties in litigation.15  Insurance contracts are de-
signed to minimize expected liability costs, including defense costs and
outlays to satisfy claims.  Funding contracts are intended to maximize
net expected gains from lawsuits.
The tools used to accomplish the respective aims are similar but
also differ somewhat.  Liability insurers manage quality and cost ruth-
lessly and creatively.  They make defense-related decisions directly,
thereby obtaining complete freedom to use their vast experience deal-
ing with lawyers to minimize litigation costs.  They decide which law-
yers to hire, obtain volume discounts by concentrating work in a small
number of firms, maintain staff counsel operations in areas where the
volume of work is sufficient to justify the expense, subject lawyers to
litigation management guidelines and audits, and use innovative fee
12. Cf. Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 489–90
(2012).
13. Sources suggest that funders limit their investments to 20% of the value of plaintiffs’
claims. See, e.g., J. Burton LeBlanc & S. Anne Saucer, All About Alternative Litigation Financ-
ing, TRIAL, Jan. 2013, at 16, 18 (citing GARBER, supra note 8, at 12).
14. Steinitz, supra note 12, at 505 (“[S]taged financing . . . increases the incentives of the . . .
plaintiff to expand the effort needed to maintain or enhance the value of the venture or litiga-
tion.  In other words, it reduces agency problems.” (footnote omitted)).
15. On the use of contracts to maximize parties’ joint gains, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
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arrangements to motivate outstanding performance.16  Insurers also
control settlement negotiations and decision making.  This enables
them to act on their incentive to minimize costs by deploying their
knowledge of claim values with maximum effect.
The extent to which third-party funders manage litigation varies
across contexts.17  Funders who engage in what has been called “con-
sumer legal funding” make small investments in large numbers of
cases, with returns tied to the amount advanced and the time that
elapses before the funder is paid.18  Because these funders typically
extend no more than a small fraction of the estimated value of a claim,
they have little interest in managing prosecution costs, which are un-
likely to affect their returns.  They rely on the market for legal ser-
vices to ensure that plaintiffs are represented by lawyers whose
services are reasonably priced and who are incentivized by contingent
percentage fees to maximize claim values.  Consumer funders also use
the market to screen cases.  An attorney’s willingness to handle a case
on contingency signals to a funder that a claim is sufficiently meritori-
ous to warrant an investment.  In this respect, funders resemble liabil-
ity insurers, who also use representation by plaintiffs’ attorneys to
identify claims that are likely to merit payments.
Not all plaintiffs’ attorneys are created equal, of course.  Quality
differences provide litigation funders the opportunity to discipline the
market for legal services by identifying inferior attorneys and avoiding
them.  Disfavored attorneys will find it hard to compete because they
will have difficulty attracting clients and experience higher operating
costs.  At this time, however, the extent to which funders distinguish
among attorneys is not clear.
In theory, funders operating in the commercial litigation sector,
where investments often exceed $1 million, could become more exten-
sively involved in the conduct of litigation and would more closely
16. See WILLIAM T. BARKER & CHARLES SILVER, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSUR-
ANCE DEFENSE COUNSEL § 1.02 (2012); see also Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys:
Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Law-
yers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205, 216–18 (1997).  Insurance scholars once hoped that large insurers
would also manage the cost and quality of legal services for claimants. See Werner Pfennigstorf
& Spencer L. Kimball, Regulation of Legal Service Plans, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 357,
411–13.  The market did not develop, however.
17. The extent of funder control varies considerably across countries and is more limited in
the United States than elsewhere.  For an extensive account, see Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Justice
for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation
Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (2013).  Funding arrangements in many countries are described
in THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Christopher
Hodges et al. eds., 2010).
18. GARBER, supra note 8, at 9, 12.
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resemble liability insurers if they did.  They could demand the right to
select counsel, decide litigation strategy, and consider settlement op-
portunities.  In fact, the extent of their involvement varies greatly.
There are famous instances of “intermeddling,” in which funders con-
trolled the inception and conduct of litigation, but there are also ex-
amples in which they took “back seat” positions despite making large
investments.19  Both the history of liability insurance and
microeconomic theory suggest that extensive involvement by commer-
cial litigation funders may become the norm.20
Funders, who tend to be experienced lawyers with strong back-
grounds in litigation, may also enhance the quality of legal services by
monitoring plaintiffs’ attorneys.  They may often be able to assess the
caliber of the representation plaintiffs receive more accurately than
plaintiffs can themselves, and they may also provide more informed
feedback on litigation strategy and other matters to lawyers.  In effect,
they have the potential to become agents who watch other agents for
the benefit of themselves and the plaintiffs in whose cases they in-
vest.21  One can easily imagine them improving their monitoring abili-
ties by requiring plaintiffs’ lawyers to adhere to litigation management
guidelines and subjecting them to expense audits.  Insurers subject de-
fense lawyers to these management techniques already.
III. LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THIRD-PARTY
FUNDING CONTRASTED
In the preceding Part, I attempted to set up an inference that one
can shed light on the merits of objections to third-party litigation
funding by studying the law governing the defense and settlement of
claims by liability insurers.  In my view, the two methods of handling
lawsuit-related risks have a good deal in common, especially certain
problems of microeconomics.
Insurance and litigation funding are not identical, however, and the
differences between them could make it perilous to reason from one
to the other.  This is Michelle Boardman’s view.  In an article entitled
Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund, she argues that the analogy I
19. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES 23 & n.82 (2012) [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER] (reporting instances in which “[alter-
native litigation funding] suppliers disclaim[ed] any control over the decision-making of lawyers,
stating that they are in an entirely passive role”).
20. See Steinitz, supra note 12, at 501–17 (contending that funders should exercise extensive
control over the conduct of litigation).
21. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1315 (2012); see also Steinitz, supra note 12, at 499–500.
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draw is strained.22  In her view, the differences between liability insur-
ance and third-party funding overwhelm “the occasional similarity.”
Consequently, she contends, liability insurance has little to teach
about the merits of litigation funding.
Boardman identifies five “key” differences between liability insur-
ance and lawsuit funding:
(1) the contractual relationship [between the policyholder and the
liability carrier] precedes the litigation.
Thus,
(2) the insurer’s involvement in the litigation is automatic, not an
investment choice, and
(3) litigation funding is not the primary purpose of the contract.
Once a legal claim is made,
(4) the policyholder has a duty to cooperate with the insurer, and
(5) the policyholder and the insurer are co-clients of the [defense]
lawyer.23
In her view, these differences undermine the following three common
arguments for litigation funding:
First, insurers are third-party litigation funders (as are contingency
fee lawyers).  Thus, we can see that third-party litigation funding
works well in the United States already and should not cause alarm.
Second, litigation funding is necessary on the plaintiff side to restore
parity between plaintiffs and insurer-backed defendants.  Support-
ers have not used this language, but one version of the claim is that
insurer defense creates an imbalance with negative externalities.
Third, insurer control of policyholder litigation is less intrusive than
funder involvement will be.  Because insurer control is accepted, a
lower level of funder involvement should be as well.24
In sum, Boardman contends, liability carrier involvement on the de-
fense side of lawsuits cannot legitimate the participation of funders on
the plaintiff side.25
It is, of course, well and good to remind readers of the limits of
analogical reasoning.  But it is also reasonable to ask people who sup-
port one practice while opposing another to offer compelling distinc-
tions.  In my view, the similarities between liability insurance and
litigation funding are stronger than the differences Boardman points
out.
Consider the “key” differences between liability insurance and liti-
gation funding that Boardman identifies.  Not all forms of liability in-
22. Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of Litigation
Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 673 (2012).
23. Id. at 680 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
24. Id. at 689–90.
25. Id. at 673.
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surance share them.  First and foremost, not all liability insurance
policies are sold before losses occur.  Consequently, not all liability
insurers can be said to become involved in lawsuits automatically
rather than by choice.26
Boardman seems not to know that defendants already caught up in
litigation can buy retroactive coverage for existing liability claims.27  A
famous example involved the MGM Grand Hotel, which caught fire
on November 21, 1980.
After the fire, MGM . . . obtained an additional $170 million in cov-
erage as retroactive insurance.  This was accomplished well after the
fire had occurred, the physical damage had been assessed, and nu-
merous suits had been filed against MGM.  When coverage began,
however, the loss was unknown, and insurance was obtainable be-
cause the extent of MGM’s legal liability had not yet been
determined.28
Retroactive coverage, also known as “loss mitigation” insurance, is
available for lawsuits creating securities, employment, intellectual
property, and product liability exposures.29
Retroactive policies lack at least two of Boardman’s “key” features.
They relate to events and lawsuits that precede the contractual rela-
tionship between the policyholder and the carrier, and they are sold
by carriers that decide to incur exposure to lawsuits that are already
ongoing or highly likely to occur.  Retroactive coverage may also pos-
sess a third feature that is at odds with Boardman’s account.  If the
26. See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629,
1644–46 (1994).
27. For discussions of retroactive insurance and the underlying economics, see Stephen P.
Baginski et al., Catastrophic Events and Retroactive Liability Insurance: The Case of the MGM
Grand Fire, 58 J. RISK & INS. 247 (1991); Michael L. Smith & Robert C. Witt, An Economic
Analysis of Retroactive Liability Insurance, 52 J. RISK & INS. 379 (1985); Emilio C. Venezian &
Joseph A. Fields, Informational Asymmetries in Retroactive Insurance, 54 J. RISK & INS. 780
(1987).
28. Matt W. Holley, The “Fortuity Doctrine”: Misapplying the Known Loss Rule to Liability
Insurance Policies, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 529, 533 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
29. Susanne Sclafane, Cover Available for Known Securities Claims, NAT’L UNDERWRITER:
PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Jan. 31, 2000, at 6, 6, available at http://
m.propertycasualty360.com/2000/02/05/cover-available-for-known-securities-claims.  Another
type of retroactive policy is simply a loan by the insurer to cover known losses, which the policy-
holder repays over time in the form of premiums. See Kali N. Bracey et al., Client Advisory:
When the Regulators Come Calling, Will Your Company Have the Right D&O Coverage?, JEN-
NER & BLOCK (Feb. 2, 2010), http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/541/original/When_
The_Regulators_Come_Calling_Will_Your_Company_Have_The_Right_DO_Coverage_02.10.
pdf?1313681432. (“Loss mitigation products often involve a retroactive insurance policy in which
an insurer lends a policyholder money to pay for known losses in the first year of the policy and
the ‘premiums’ the policyholder pays in subsequent policy years are actually repayments on the
loan.”).  The similarity between this form of insurance and litigation funding could hardly be
clearer.
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insurer agrees to bear defense costs, litigation funding will be a pri-
mary purpose of the contract.30  Because liability insurance need not
conform to many of Boardman’s “key” features, it seems odd to as-
sign those features critical importance when comparing liability insur-
ance and third-party litigation funding.
Now consider Boardman’s caution against using the presence of in-
surers on the defense side to justify the participation of third-party
funders for plaintiffs:
[T]he problem with the claim that insurers are litigation financiers is
not its inaccuracy but its superficiality.  Insurers obviously pay for
legal costs in litigation.  In the vast majority of cases, insurers do this
. . . as co-clients of the lawyer representing the defendant . . . .  In
other words, the insurer is . . . not a third party . . . .  The difference
between these relationships and third-party litigation funding does
not mean that the two should never be mentioned in the same
breath.  It does mean that in an analysis of third-party litigation
funding, little can be said to automatically follow from the fact that
insurers fund litigation.31
Here, Boardman makes a basic mistake.  The fact, when it is one,32
that an insurer is a co-client of the defense lawyer handling the liabil-
ity suit against the policyholder does not make the insurer a first-party
funder.33  The carrier remains a third party to the litigation because it
is not a named defendant.  It is a nonparty using particular control and
funding arrangements to minimize its contractual exposure to losses.
30. An example of a retroactive D&O policy that covered defense costs appears in Sclafane,
supra note 29.
31. Boardman, supra note 22, at 691.
32. Not all forms of liability insurance give insurers control of lawsuits against policyholders.
Some leave policyholders in charge.  Insurance covering securities fraud claims against the direc-
tors and officers of public companies (“D&O” insurance) is an example. See Tom Baker & Rick
Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60
UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1426 (2013) (explaining that “D&O insurance policies are ‘defense cost
payment’ policies, rather than ‘duty to defend’ policies, so that someone insured by a D&O
policy gets to choose their own defense lawyer and direct their own defense”).  Some profes-
sional liability policies for attorneys also leave lawyers in charge. See LAWPRO, 2013 PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR LAWYERS 2 (2013), available at http://www.lawpro.ca/
insurance/pdf/LAWPRO_Policy2013.pdf (giving carrier a duty to defend but not a right to de-
fend).  Insurers that lack the right to control the defense normally are third-party payers, not co-
clients of the lawyers who defend their insureds.
33. Kent Syverud and I provided a systematic defense of the view that insurers are co-clients.
See Charles Silver & Kent D. Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense
Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255 (1995); see also Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel
Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583 (1994), cited in Boardman, supra
note 22, at 687 n.55.  But we explicitly left open the possibility that a carrier can be a non-client.
Silver & Syverud, supra, at 274.  Some states also deny insurers client status as a matter of law.
See BARKER & SILVER, supra note 16, § 4.04.  The doctrine is indefensible, but it is the law.
Consequently, in several states, carriers are not co-clients.
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Even if Boardman were right to deny that insurers are third parties,
litigation funders could eliminate the difference by mimicking insurers
and becoming co-clients too.  Nothing prevents a funder, a plaintiff,
and a contingent fee lawyer from agreeing that the funder will be a co-
client.  They have the same freedom as insurers, policyholders, and
defense lawyers to structure their relationships as they wish.  They can
even duplicate the arrangements policyholders and insurers use to
their advantage by giving funders control of defense and settlement
decisions.
Working arrangements between plaintiffs and funders may eventu-
ally resemble those used by insurers and policyholders more closely
than they do today.  If there is an advantage to be gained, they proba-
bly will; otherwise, they will not.  Either way, it is odd to think, as
Boardman apparently does, that the details of working arrangements
should distract one from the bigger picture.  Insurers and funders both
use contracts to acquire exposures to lawsuits that they underwrite.
Now consider Boardman’s third contention: that funder involve-
ment in litigation may be more objectionable than insurer involve-
ment, even though the latter is more extensive.  Boardman mentions
many considerations when making this point,34 the most important of
which seems to be that liability carriers have more skin in the game.
“[I]t is not simply that insurers have more control over their policy-
holder’s [sic] defense; insurers have more at stake in the litigation and
play a more equal role as co-client.”35  Whereas insurers normally pay
34. Boardman appears to misunderstand some legal doctrines applicable to insurance defense
and settlement arrangements.  She writes that “both the insurance contract and the common law
charge the policyholder and the insurer with cooperation and fiduciary duties toward one an-
other.”  Boardman, supra note 22, at 696.  In fact, when it comes to the defense and settlement
of claims, insurers are not policyholders’ fiduciaries.  Insurers may, and commonly do, give their
own interests weight. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. 1987) (“[A
defending liability insurer] may make economic decisions without the assent of the insured.  The
insured may want a quick settlement to eliminate further demands on time and energy, but the
insurer does not have to settle unless a satisfactory offer is forthcoming.  Or the insurer may
accept a settlement offer even though the insured wants to go to trial to establish freedom from
fault.  The insurer may decide what to spend in defense, what discovery is to be had, and what
experts to hire.  It also has the right to select counsel to defend its interests.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their Insureds, 88 KY.
L.J. 1 (2000).  Because Boardman gets the doctrine wrong, she also mistakenly thinks she can
weaken the analogy between litigation funding and insurance defense by pointing out that a
funder “will be tempted to privilege its interests over the plaintiff’s when they diverge.”  Board-
man, supra note 22, at 696.  Rather, this observation strengthens the analogy.  Most controver-
sies concerning the professional responsibilities of insurance defense lawyers involve conflict
situations in which insurers may put their own interests ahead of the interests of their insureds.
35. Boardman, supra note 22, at 695.
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all litigation and settlement costs,36 funders bear only a fraction of the
former and receive only part of the latter.  Consequently, insurer in-
volvement in litigation is more easily justified than funder involve-
ment and raises fewer interest conflicts.
It is hard to know what to make of this claim.  On the one hand,
Boardman rightly asserts that insurers and funders have different
stakes in the lawsuits in which they participate.  This is inevitable.
Carriers bear losses while funders share in gains.  Their positions dif-
fer from the get-go.  The law also permits insurers to cover losses in
their entirety.  Funders cannot as easily acquire complete ownership
of claims.  If Boardman’s point is that, because of these differences,
conflicts will differ in frequency, severity, and nature across the two
contexts, she is surely correct.
That admitted, the deeper similarities again outweigh the differ-
ences.  First, conflicts arise in both insured representations and funded
representations because in both it is impossible to use contractual ar-
rangements that achieve first-best results.  First-best contracts would
incentivize parties to maximize joint gains in all contexts.  Real insur-
ance contracts and funding contracts fail this test because, under both,
situations may arise in which individual contracting parties can ad-
vance their own self-interest by acting other than for the common
good of all contracting parties considered together.
Both insurance relationships and funding relationships involve a
trio of parties: insurers, policyholders, and defense lawyers on the one
hand; funders, plaintiffs, and plaintiffs’ attorneys on the other.  Ide-
ally, the contracts governing these tripartite relationships—the insur-
ance contract and retainer agreement on one side and the funding
contract and retainer agreement on the other—would maximize the
joint gains of all three participants by incentivizing each participant
always to act for the benefit of all.
But, as we know, each participant can sometimes gain by acting to
the disadvantage of the group.  In the insurance defense context, in-
surers may find it advantageous to reject policy-limits settlement de-
mands that, if accepted, would minimize joint losses.  Policyholders
worried about reputational interests or excess exposure may benefit
by pressuring insurers to accept within-limits settlement demands that
36. My empirical research group has produced the best evidence for this claim. See Charles
Silver et al., Malpractice Payouts and Malpractice Insurance: Evidence from Texas Closed
Claims, 1990–2003, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.: ISSUES & PRAC. 177, 182–84 (2008); see
also Zeiler et al., supra note 1, at S23–26.  The tendency of claims to settle at or within the policy
limits being admitted, it is also true that many policyholders are underinsured relative to possible
judgments.  An unknown number of these policyholders (probably many) lack attachable assets.
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are unreasonably high.  Defense lawyers may advise insurers to reject
reasonable demands because they charge by the hour and prefer to
keep working.
Analogous conflicts arise on the plaintiffs’ side.  A funder may pre-
fer a cheap, early settlement to a later, wealth-maximizing one be-
cause its portion of a lawsuit’s upside potential is small.  A plaintiff
may reject a reasonable settlement offer and take a flyer at trial be-
cause only a victory at trial can produce a substantial benefit for the
plaintiff.  A lawyer working on contingency may reduce his or her own
exposure to risk by spreading time across a portfolio of cases in a way
that maximizes the expected value of none.
Because the contracts that govern the two tripartite relationships
fail to eliminate conflicts like these, they are “constrained efficient,”
not “first-best.”37  They reduce the frequency and severity of conflicts
to efficient levels, given the informational and other constraints the
three participants face.  This is as it should be.  Conflicts are sources of
costs, so the participants should want to minimize them and should
settle on structures that have this effect.  For example, in insured tri-
partite relationships, the combination of complete insurer ownership
of losses, plenary insurer control of the defense, insurer financial re-
sponsibility for the defense, and insurer discretion to settle works
well.38  In funded tripartite relationships, constrained efficient work-
ing arrangements are still evolving.  Partial funder ownership of gains
paired with the usual relationship between the contingent fee lawyer
and the plaintiff seems to work well in some contexts.  In others,
funders desire more control because they make larger commitments
and face bigger risks.  Regardless, the similarity of the conflict
problems in the two tripartite relationships is clear.
This is why lessons learned in one context may generate helpful in-
sights into the other.  Sometimes liability insurers are defense lawyers’
co-clients; sometimes they are defense lawyers’ third-party payers.39
Doctrines have evolved to govern lawyers’ professional responsibili-
ties in both situations.  These doctrines may be valuable sources of
37. The term “constrained efficient” is borrowed from Schwartz & Scott, supra note 15, at 554
n.24.
38. In many contexts, primary insurers bear less than 100% of policyholders’ exposure.  This is
true in commercial contexts, where primary insurers often share coverage with excess insurers,
whose policies kick in when the primary layer is exhausted.  It is also true when policyholders
have deductibles or attachable assets that could be seized in the event of an uninsured judgment
in excess of the primary limits.
39. See BARKER & SILVER, supra note 16, §§ 4.01, 4.07 (discussing insurers’ status); see also
James M. Fischer, Insurer-Policyholder Interests, Defense Counsel’s Professional Duties, and the
Allocation of Power to Control the Defense, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 40 (2007).
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guidance for plaintiffs’ attorneys in funded cases.  When funders are
co-clients, as they may be but rarely are, plaintiffs’ attorneys may take
guidance from the law governing co-client relationships, which regu-
lates, among other things, whether confidential information may be
shared.  When funders are third-party payers, lawyers may look to the
law governing relationships with third parties instead.  Because the
common law takes note of the structural features of representations, it
has informational value outside the specific cases through which it
evolves.
I turn lastly to Boardman’s second claim, which criticizes the asser-
tion that litigation funding for plaintiffs will give them parity with de-
fendants, who are funded by insurers.40  Again, when making this
point, Boardman mentions a host of considerations.  But she seems to
be concerned mainly with the wisdom of allowing plaintiffs to offset
an advantage defendants gain by purchasing insurance: risk-neutral
decision making.  Because defendants are risk-averse to start with,
Boardman contends, they will predictably pay too much to avoid liti-
gation.41  This gives plaintiffs an unmerited advantage in settlement
negotiations.  Insurance offsets this advantage by giving carriers con-
trol of decisions.  Being risk-neutral, carriers will only pay in settle-
ment the expected value of claims at trial.
The logical next step would be for Boardman to argue that the cor-
rective will be undone if plaintiffs are allowed to transfer risk to law-
suit funders.  Oddly, she does not say this.  Nor does she say anything
else that might lead one to conclude that outside funding will skew
settlement values in plaintiffs’ favor illegitimately.  Instead, she ap-
pears to praise litigation funding as a means of ensuring accurate set-
tlements that reflect real claim values rather than plaintiffs’ personal
finances or their attitudes toward risk:
Having taken this advantage [i.e., the defendant’s aversion to risk]
away from the plaintiff through insurance defense, should we re-
store parity (if that is what it does) by allowing the plaintiff to trans-
fer his litigation risk?  For individual plaintiffs, the question is what
40. Boardman, supra note 22, at 692–94.
41. It would be an error to say that business corporations, insured or not, are risk-averse.
Being artificial persons rather than natural ones, corporations cannot have attitudes toward risk.
See J.B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 264, 272 (2005) (“[R]isk aversion
is a theoretical concept appropriate for individuals.”).  The most one can say is that corporations
sometimes act (through the human beings who run them) as if they were risk-averse.  I assume
that this is what Professor Boardman meant to convey, and it is certainly what I mean to say
when I write of risk-averse behavior by corporate entities.  The frequency of “as if risk-averse”
conduct by corporations involved in civil litigation is an empirical question concerning which
little evidence has been offered.  For a discussion, see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:
Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1408–15 (2003).
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value litigation funding will add over contingency fee arrangements;
lawsuit lending will give some plaintiffs the resources and time nec-
essary to continue a suit he would otherwise be forced to settle
“early.”  For commercial plaintiffs, the question of parity also comes
down to efficient settlement.[42] Litigation funding may increase the
accuracy of settlements so that they are based on the parties’ expecta-
tions about the value of the suit and not a reflection of one party’s
risk preferences.  This is the strongest point that emerges from the
comparisons between insurer defense and litigation funding.43
As I read this passage, Boardman draws an analogy between litigation
funding and insurance.  Just as liability coverage brings risk-neutrality
to the defense side, third-party funding brings risk-neutrality to plain-
tiffs.  The result should be accurate settlements that reflect the ex-
pected value of claims, as she indicates.  Boardman’s second objection
does not really seem to be one.
To the contrary, if litigation funding enables plaintiffs to hold out
for larger payments, whether by ameliorating their short-term finan-
cial needs or by transferring control to risk-neutral decision makers,
the results should be to the good.44  The single, most robust finding
produced by empirical studies of tort litigation is that victims are un-
dercompensated for their losses.45  Many injured victims simply “lump
it.”  They neither sue nor take other steps to obtain compensation.
Those who do sue often learn that the tort system is stingy.  On aver-
age, victims do not recover even their hard costs—their out-of-pocket
expenses and lost wages—let alone recompense for their pain and suf-
fering, diminished enjoyment of life, or other soft damages.  Juries
also frequently send plaintiffs with valid claims home empty-handed,
perhaps because defendants outspend plaintiffs in cases that are tried.
The empirically based argument for leveling the playing field is pretty
good.
IV. MAINTENANCE, CHAMPERTY, AND BARRATRY
Historically, certain common law doctrines and statutes forbade
third parties, including lawyers, from supporting lawsuits financially.
These offenses, known as maintenance, champerty, and barratry, were
42. Again, it is a mistake to attribute attitudes toward risk to corporations. See supra note 41.
43. Boardman, supra note 22, at 693 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
44. It is widely accepted that medical malpractice plaintiffs tend to be risk-averse. See Henry
S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation
Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199, 208 (1991); see also Stephen J. Spurr & Walter O. Simmons,
Medical Malpractice in Michigan: An Economic Analysis, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 315,
316 (1996).
45. See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Prob-
lem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 459–60 & nn.91–95 (2004).
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related:  “[P]ut simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a
suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in
the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or
champerty.”46  In the United States, the existence and details of these
prohibitions vary both over time and from place to place, but today
none of them prevents contingent fee lawyers from helping clients by
bearing litigation costs, subject to the constraint that the client must
reimburse the lawyer for the advances from any recovery.  Some
states, including Texas oddly enough, even allow lawyers to help cli-
ents with personal living expenses.47  Nonlawyers still remain subject
to the prohibitions, however, in states that continue to impose them.48
The policy reasons offered in support of prohibitions on mainte-
nance, champerty, and barratry resemble those offered in justification
of other restrictions on lawsuits, generally known as tort reforms.  Al-
legedly, third-party funding promotes frivolous litigation, vindictive
litigation (“meritorious litigation motivated by an improper motive”),
and intermeddling by nonparties in the conduct of the litigation, such
as by “determining trial strategy or controlling settlement.”49
The extent to which litigation funding by lawyers or third parties
has unwanted effects is an empirical matter, and the supporting evi-
dence is weak.  For example, except in the area of securities fraud
class action litigation, no study finds that contingent fee lawyers fre-
quently file frivolous suits.  To the contrary, many report that these
lawyers are selective, rejecting requests for representation when
claims are weak on the merits or involve damages too small to warrant
the costs and risks of litigation.50  Third-party funders should also in-
vest conservatively.  Those operating in the commercial sector make
sizeable investments in a small number of cases.  Facing large, un-
diversified risks, they should choose cases with care.  Even in the con-
sumer area, where funders invest small sums in lots of cases, they have
difficulty building portfolios large enough to yield predictable results.
46. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting Osprey, Inc. v.
Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d)(1) (2012).  I say “oddly
enough” because Texas is a notoriously anti-litigation state.
48. See DeStefano, supra note 2, at 2796.  DeStefano contends that lawyers might serve clients
better if ethics rules permitted them to work and interact more freely with third-party funders
who are not lawyers, at least in commercial lawsuits.
49. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 11.
50. On the selectivity of plaintiffs’ attorneys and their reasons for declining cases, see LaRae
I. Huycke & Mark M. Huycke, Characteristics of Potential Plaintiffs in Malpractice Litigation,
120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 792, 796 (1994); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers As
Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 24 (1997); Herbert M. Kritzer, Hold-
ing Back the Floodtide: The Role of Contingent Fee Lawyers, WIS. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 10, 63.
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Consumer litigation funders should therefore also seek out strong
cases.
Turning finally to the matter of controlling lawsuits to which one is
not a party, the charge is probably true with regard to contingent fee
lawyers but neither wholly true nor wholly false when applied to third-
party funders.  Starting with lawyers, it is well known that clients look
to attorneys for guidance and normally follow their lead.  In this re-
spect, clients resemble patients and other laypersons who participate
in relationships with doctors and other sophisticated service providers.
In each instance, the recipient desires the provider’s advice and, as-
suming proper conduct by the provider, is better off having it.  Contin-
gent fee lawyers’ recommendations should be especially reliable
because their financial interests are aligned with their clients’.  A pol-
icy intended to prevent clients from relying on lawyers’ advice would
be revolutionary and unjustifiable.  Advice is one of the essential ser-
vices clients hire lawyers to provide.
Turning now to third-party litigation funders, they sometimes seek
to influence or control the conduct of lawsuits, and the degree to
which they do so varies.51  In small personal injury cases, where they
typically have only a few thousand dollars at risk, they are often pas-
sive investors.  When their investments are larger, as is often true in
commercial lawsuits, funders
may seek to exercise some measure of control over the litigation,
including the identity of lawyers pursing the claims, litigation strat-
egy to be employed, and whether to accept a settlement offer or
refuse it and continue to trial. . . .
. . . In one Florida case, for example, the supplier had the right “to
approve the filing of the lawsuit; controlled the selection of the
plaintiffs’ attorneys; recruited fact and expert witnesses; received,
reviewed and approved counsel’s bills; and had the ability to veto
any settlement agreements.”52
The extent of funder control of litigation is thus a factual matter about
which it is difficult to generalize.  The charge of interfering in lawsuits
to which they are not parties obviously rings truer when funders de-
mand extensive control than when they do not.53
Putting the truth of the allegations to one side, cannot the same
charges be leveled against liability insurers?  Might not third-party liti-
gation funding on the defense side encourage frivolous lawsuits, vin-
51. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 21–22 (discussing variations in degree of funder
control).
52. Id. at 22 (quoting Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)).
53. For an argument that third-party funders should be treated as real parties in interest and
should control litigation of funded claims, see Steinitz, supra note 12.
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dictive lawsuits, and intermeddling in the conduct of litigation?54
Affirmative answers seem clear.
To see why, one must first understand that insurance makes many
potential defendants more attractive targets for lawsuits than they
would otherwise be.  This is especially true in the personal lines area,
where most policyholders have too few attachable assets to be worth
suing.  As Stephen Yeazell observed in a wonderful article explaining
the link between liability coverage and the growth of civil litigation,
“No one working on a contingent fee intentionally sues an insolvent
defendant.”55  The reason for filing a damages action is almost always
to get paid.  Because liability insurance makes money available to sat-
isfy covered claims, it encourages litigation, including lawsuits that
some might describe as vexatious or meritless.
Tort reform advocates, who oppose third-party funding for plaintiffs
vehemently, are in no position to deny that liability insurance for de-
fendants has this effect.  They complain loudly that most lawsuits
against doctors are meritless.  Because liability insurers fund essen-
tially 100% of the payments in medical malpractice cases, liability in-
surance must be the magnet that attracts frivolous medical
malpractice claims.56  The same must be true in other areas, such as
securities fraud litigation against the directors and officers of public
companies, where liability insurers are the bankers for the civil justice
system and nonmeritorious cases are said to abound.
Liability carriers also meddle in the conduct of litigation routinely.
Standard policies sold in diverse coverage lines give them plenary con-
trol of the defense and settlement of claims.  When exercising their
contractual rights, they may consider their own interests and do what
they think best, even when policyholders disagree.  These arrange-
ments make sense because insurers bear all but a small fraction of the
cost of defending and settling liability claims.57  Even so, because they
are third parties, not defendants in litigation, liability carriers are in-
termeddlers nonpareil.
Given the ease of connecting liability insurance to the frequency of
lawsuits of all quality types and the extent of carrier control, the main-
tenance-, champerty-, and barratry-based objections to third-party
funding seem to merit little weight.  Because the policy concerns that
54. It may seem more natural to suggest that the presence of insurance increases the likeli-
hood of frivolous or vexatious conduct in connection with the defense of litigation.
55. Yeazell, supra note 4, at 186.
56. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
57. Zeiler et al., supra note 36, at S11, found that insurers bore 99.4% of payments on medical
malpractice claims that closed in Texas 1988–2003.
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underlie these prohibitions have not been invoked to forbid defend-
ants from enjoying the benefits of liability insurance, there is no obvi-
ous reason to deny plaintiffs the similar benefits third-party funders
provide.  The fact that liability insurance is mandatory in many con-
texts may strengthen this conclusion.58  To the extent that these re-
quirements reflect the desire to ensure that sufficient assets are
available to cover tort-related losses, they establish that victims’ inter-
ests often trump concerns about encouraging lawsuits or third-party
intermeddling.
Finally, it bears mention that insurers often fund the prosecution of
civil lawsuits after satisfying claims and becoming subrogated to the
rights of insureds.59  For example, after paying for repairs to a policy-
holder’s damaged car, an automobile insurer may underwrite a lawsuit
against the driver thought to have caused the accident, or a home-
owner’s carrier may sue a plumbing contractor whose shoddy work
caused a policyholder’s kitchen to flood.  The policyholder will likely
be the nominal plaintiff in the lawsuit and may also have a financial
stake in it, such as an uninsured loss or a deductible.60  But the carrier
may fund the subrogation action, control it, and be the real party in
interest for much of the case, having stepped into the policyholder’s
shoes by acquiring its right to sue.  Although third-party funding of
lawsuits has spawned considerable controversy, there is no equivalent
debate over the propriety of insurer-financed subrogation lawsuits.
This is true even though subrogation involves claim transfers and
often claim-sharing, and clearly increases the resources that are avail-
able to support litigation.
58. States require drivers to maintain minimum levels of liability coverage as a condition for
obtaining licenses or renewing vehicle registrations.  Homeowner’s insurance, which contains a
liability component, is a practical condition for obtaining a mortgage.  Many hospitals and pro-
vider organizations require doctors to purchase medical malpractice insurance.
59. See William E. Gericke, Remember the Basics—Make Sure the Insured Knows Whether
Subrogation Counsel Is Representing Their Interests, SUBROGATION & RECOVERY L. BLOG (Feb.
20, 2012, 12:03 PM), http://www.subrogationrecoverylawblog.com/2012/02/articles/subro-
roundup/remember-the-basicsmake-sure-the-insured-knows-whether-subrogation-counsel-is-
representing-their-interests/.
60. When a policyholder has a stake in a subrogation action, settlement-related conflicts can
arise like those that sometimes occur between plaintiffs and funders.  For a discussion of con-
flicts in subrogation cases, see Anthony J. Sebok, Control Issues: Litigation Investment, Insurance
Law, and Double Standards (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced
Legal Studies, Faculty Research Paper No. 394, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2271762.
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V. THE REQUIREMENT THAT ATTORNEYS EXERCISE INDEPENDENT
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
Many sources express the concern that third-party funding may pre-
vent lawyers from giving clients the benefit of their independent pro-
fessional judgment, something all states’ disciplinary rules require.61
The ABA’s Working Group on Alternative Litigation Finance (Work-
ing Group) expressed this view.  It argued that a contract “delegating
decision-making authority” to a third-party funder
may create such a limitation on an attorney’s professional judgment
that a reasonable lawyer might conclude that it is impossible to pro-
vide competent representation to that client. . . .  For example, a
provision in a contract may permit the supplier to refuse further
funding if the lawyer makes decisions in the course of the represen-
tation with which the supplier has a fundamental disagreement.
The lawyer, on the other hand, has an obligation to act with reason-
able competence and diligence in the representation of the client,
and may reasonably believe that the funder’s second-guessing of de-
cisions made in the representation of the client is an unreasonable
interference with the lawyer’s professional judgment.62
The identical objection was raised against liability insurers’ use of liti-
gation management guidelines.  Guidelines, we were told, interfered
with defense lawyers’ independent professional judgment because
they restricted the means lawyers could use to deliver legal services to
policyholders.  Lawyers had to be free to decide how much legal re-
search would be done, whether lawyers or paralegals would handle
particular tasks, whether to take discovery, whether to file motions
and pleadings, etc.63
Although advisory committees and courts in some states agreed
with this charge, most rejected it and rightly so.64  First, as a linguistic
matter, it is obvious that a rule requiring lawyers to “exercise indepen-
61. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THIRD PARTY FINANCING: ETHICAL
& LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS IN COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 16 (2009) (contending that “[a]ttorneys ad-
vising a client at the outset of a case may be reluctant to provide the client full and candid advice
in writing, knowing that any communications could be viewed by the funder as part of its dili-
gence, and then would be available to the opposing party in discovery”).
62. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 23.  The duty to exercise independent professional
judgment is memorialized in Rules 1.8, 2.1, and 5.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
See id. at 4 & nn.7–8.
63. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2000-
3 (2000) (holding that litigation management guidelines interfere with defense lawyers’ indepen-
dent professional judgment in the ways identified in the text).
64. The controversy surrounding litigation management guidelines and my views on the pro-
fessional responsibility issues they raise are set out in Charles Silver, When Should Government
Regulate Lawyer-Client Relationships? The Campaign to Prevent Insurers from Managing De-
fense Costs, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 787 (2002), which also contains a list of relevant advisory ethics
opinions. See id. at app. 1; see also BARKER & SILVER, supra note 16.
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dent professional judgment and render candid advice” neither em-
powers nor requires lawyers to act unilaterally.65  It requires them to
be independent and candid when recommending courses of action.
The members of the Working Group reached the conclusion they did
because they “confused freedom of judgment with freedom of action.
Lawyers must always have the former, but they rarely, if ever, have
the latter and no rule requires clients to give it to them.”66  As I wrote
years ago when the battle over insurance defense lawyers’ responsibil-
ities was raging:
It is easy to forget, but essential to remember, that lawyers are first
and foremost agents and advisors, not decision makers.  Their job is
to generate and recommend strategies for protecting clients’ inter-
ests and, after doing so, to follow their client[s’] lawful marching
orders as given.  Following orders may require a lawyer to employ a
strategy a lawyer neither recommends nor endorses.  This does not
mean that a client violates a duty to the lawyer or that a client im-
pairs a lawyer’s independence of professional judgment.  As a prin-
cipal, a client can properly decline to follow a lawyer’s suggestions,
including suggestions that are simply too expensive.  No rule re-
quires a client to pay a lawyer for actions a lawyer wants to take.
That clients frequently reject expensive suggestions and require law-
yers to stick to budgets is a matter to which any experienced lawyer
will attest.67
A decision to reject a lawyer’s recommendation cannot interfere with
a lawyer’s professional judgment.  This is true whether the decision is
made by a client, an insurer, or a third-party funder and regardless of
the grounds upon which it is based.
Second, the Working Group erred when it contended that a con-
tractual provision “permit[ting] the supplier to refuse further funding
if the lawyer makes decisions in the course of the representation with
which the supplier has a fundamental disagreement” can endanger a
lawyer’s ability to provide competent representation.68  To see why,
suppose a lawyer recommends a litigation move that a client rejects.
Can the lawyer be liable to the client for malpractice?  No.  It is black
letter law that a client has no claim against a lawyer in this situation.
The law treats the representation as competent because the lawyer
made the recommendation, even though the client chose a different
course.
It is reasonable to suppose that the law would treat the example
described by the Working Group similarly.  Suppose a lawyer recom-
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013).
66. Silver, supra note 16, at 230–31 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 231 (footnotes omitted).
68. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 23.
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mends a course of action that a funder opposes.  If the contract with
the client empowers the funder to reject the recommendation, then
the funder has stepped into the client’s shoes and should be treated
similarly.  In practical effect, the client has retained the funder to
manage the delivery of legal services, making attribution of the
funder’s decision to the client the sensible course.  Alternatively, the
funder may not control the decision but may threaten to withdraw
support from the case.  In this event, the client must decide whether to
do as the lawyer recommends or as the funder wants, so responsibility
for the outcome rests with the client yet again.  That the client may
feel pressure from the funder to follow a particular course should have
no bearing on the result.  Clients reject lawyers’ recommendations for
all sorts of reasons, including expense, and must often make unpleas-
ant tradeoffs when doing so.
Third, the example used by the Working Group, which rests on the
possibility that the funder will withdraw further financial support if
the client pursues a particular course, has an analogue in insured liti-
gation.  An insurer can lawfully withdraw a paid defense in certain
situations.  The right to do so may arise, for example, when a policy-
holder refuses to cooperate in the defense, insists on controlling the
defense, or exhausts the policy limits.  Clearly, the possibility of losing
a paid defense could be as serious a problem for a defendant as the
loss of a funder’s support might be for a plaintiff, and could easily
influence either party’s decisions.  But the possibility that an insurer
might decline to pay for the defense going forward has never been
thought to justify a prohibition on insured representations or to raise
insuperable problems for attorneys.
VI. CONTROL OF THE DECISION TO SETTLE
The  Working Group worried a good deal about the possibility that
a client might give a third-party funder control of the settlement deci-
sion, whether the grant of control would be revocable, and whether an
irrevocable grant would require a lawyer to withdraw.  After noting
that clients can give lawyers revocable authority to settle, the Working
Group continued:
In principle there would appear to be no reason why the client
could not delegate revocable settlement authority to other
agents. . . .  The more difficult question is whether a user of [third-
party] financing may contractually agree to make an irrevocable au-
thorization to the [funding] supplier to approve or reject a settle-
ment offer. . . .  [A]s a matter of contract law a client may be able to
enter into an enforceable provision in a contract with an ALF sup-
plier, giving the supplier the right to accept or reject a proposed
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settlement.  It is a significant open question whether that contrac-
tual delegation is such a significant limitation on the lawyer’s repre-
sentation of the client—because it interferes with the lawyer’s
exercise of independent professional judgment—that the lawyer
must withdraw from the representation of a client who has agreed
to such a contract provision.69
Once again, the prospect of limiting a lawyer’s independent profes-
sional judgment reared its head.
When one focuses on the essentials, it is not clear why an irrevoca-
ble transfer of control of the settlement decision would pose any diffi-
culty for an attorney.  Suppose that after receiving a settlement offer a
lawyer advises a client to accept it, believing, correctly one may sup-
pose, that the client is likely to recover less at trial.  In response, the
client points out that the third-party litigation funder is entitled to
make the call.  The lawyer then gives the funder the same recommen-
dation, which the funder either accepts or rejects.  In either event, the
lawyer is in the clear.  By advising the client, and later the funder, to
settle, the lawyer made the independent recommendation required by
the disciplinary rules.
The client and the funder may disagree, of course.  The client may
want to accept an offer that the funder prefers to reject, or vice versa.
Either situation may create difficulties for the plaintiff’s attorney, but
the proper path for the lawyer is reasonably clear.  If the plaintiff and
the funder are co-clients, the lawyer is prohibited from acting to the
detriment of either and may not accept the settlement offer at the
request of one over the objection of the other.  If the funder is a non-
client payer, the lawyer must do what the plaintiff wants or, if the
lawyer fears incurring civil liability to the funder, withdraw.70
The classic case of Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund &
Belom71 offers a relevant example from the insurance defense context.
After being sued for medical malpractice, Dr. Rogers told the defense
lawyers chosen by his insurer that he strongly opposed settling the
case.72  His professional liability policy entitled his insurer to settle
without his consent, however, and the insurer instructed the lawyers
to settle the lawsuit, which they did.  Dr. Rogers then sued both the
69. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 26–27.
70. Under agency law, a lawyer may not ignore a client’s instruction.  Silver & Syverud, supra
note 33, at 322 & n.170.  This is true even if the client promised not to give the instruction at
issue, that is, even when the instruction is unauthorized.  If the plaintiff made an irrevocable
transfer of authority to the funder, a different issue may arise—namely, the possibility that the
lawyer may incur liability to the funder by following the plaintiff’s instruction.  In this event, the
safe course for the lawyer is to withdraw.
71. Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980).
72. Id. at 203–04.
640 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:617
insurer and the defense lawyers for ignoring his demand.  The former
escaped liability on contractual grounds.73  Because the insurer was
entitled to settle without Dr. Rogers’s permission, the court found
that he had no claim.  The lawyers were not as lucky.  Because they
participated in an attorney–client relationship with Dr. Rogers, they
were no freer to ignore his instruction than any other lawyer would
have been.74  Agency law, not the insurance contract, governed the
attorney–client relationship, and agency law imposes a duty of obedi-
ence.  Instead of helping the carrier resolve the claim, the defense law-
yers should have told it to exercise its power to settle by means of a
claims representative or other agent who represented the carrier
alone.
A third-party litigation funder would occupy the same position as
the malpractice carrier in Rogers.  Once empowered to accept a settle-
ment offer without a plaintiff’s consent, a funder would be free to do
so directly or by means of an independent agent.  It could also use the
plaintiff’s attorney to consummate the deal if the plaintiff was like-
minded.  Otherwise, a plaintiff’s attorney would violate the duty of
obedience by settling at the funder’s request over the plaintiff’s
objection.
One can even imagine that third-party funders will take over re-
sponsibility for negotiating settlements entirely, leaving plaintiffs’ at-
torneys out of the loop.  Insurance companies regularly use claims
professionals instead of defense lawyers when negotiating settlements.
Why should similar arrangements not be available on the plaintiffs’
side?  Although plaintiffs’ attorneys are accustomed to negotiating
settlements, the scope of their representation of clients is not cast in
stone.  Their job could be limited to prosecuting claims, just as insur-
ers often retain lawyers only to provide defense-related services.
The prospect of being excluded from settlement negotiations will
likely rankle plaintiffs’ attorneys, for whom handling negotiations has
always been part of the job and one of its highlights.  Exclusion may
also cause financial concerns.  When third-party funders handle nego-
tiations, might they not also receive settlement checks?  And if they
do, what guarantee will plaintiffs’ attorneys have of being paid and
having their costs reimbursed?  Will funders review attorneys’ ex-
penses before paying them?  Will they provide settlement statements
to plaintiffs, another task plaintiffs’ attorneys have long performed?
73. Id. at 204–05.
74. Id. at 205–06.
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When one focuses on practical matters like these, one begins to see
that the rise of third-party funding may radically alter the traditional
plaintiffs’ attorney’s business model.  As funders assume greater re-
sponsibility for costs, their control of claim prosecutions should grow.
Eventually, they may dominate the process, as liability insurers do on
the defense side.  Lawyers who now practice independently and
charge contingent fees may eventually become salaried employees of
funders’ staff counsel operations.  Such far-reaching changes could be
good for claimants.  Competition for business should pressure funders
to offer the best possible terms to claimants and to develop the most
efficient working arrangements, including arrangements that minimize
litigation costs.
VII. SETTLEMENT INCENTIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
At present, of course, plaintiffs’ attorneys continue to handle settle-
ment negotiations and to make settlement recommendations to cli-
ents.  Perhaps the most interesting difficulty stemming from third-
party funding arrangements concerns the latter.  How, if at all, should
the fact that a client will share a recovery with a third-party funder
affect a plaintiff’s lawyer’s settlement advice?
The  Working Group struggled with this difficulty.  Using an exam-
ple discussed in Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp.,75 the
Working Group explained how dividing a recovery could affect a
plaintiff’s assessment of the desirability of a settlement:
[I]n the Rancman case, the Ohio Supreme Court was worried about
the effect on settlement of the [funding] supplier’s right to receive
the first $16,800 of settlement proceeds, in exchange for having pre-
viously provided the plaintiff with $6,000.  The court noted that, as-
suming the plaintiff was also obligated to pay her attorney a 30%
contingency fee, she would be indifferent between a settlement of-
fer of $24,000 and nothing at all, because if she received nothing she
would be permitted to keep the $6,000 advanced by the supplier.76
75. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
76. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 27 (footnote omitted).  Similar problems have
arisen in other cases.  For example, in Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., the
plaintiff figured out that she would make money only if the recovery exceeded $1.2 million and
therefore refused a settlement offer of $1 million.  162 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (W.D.N.C. 2001).  In
still other cases, clients who did not understand that little would be left over for them sued their
lawyers for failing to protect their interests.  One such instance is reported in Christine Simmons,
Client Sues Firm After Funders Recover Most of His Settlement, N.Y. L.J., July 19, 2012, at 1.  Not
all of these suits have fared well.  In Francis v. Mirman, Markovits & Landau P.C., No. 029993/
2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 3, 2012), the trial court dismissed a malpractice complaint
filed by a personal injury client who claimed that his lawyers failed to warn him that funders
would receive nearly all of his recovery. Francis is discussed in Law Firm Wins Dismissal of Suit
by Client Whose Litigation Loans Ate Up Settlement, 29 LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/
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This analysis is correct.  When deciding how to respond to settlement
offers, the plaintiff would have ignored the $6,000 advanced by the
funding supplier, which was a sunk gain.77  As long as the odds of
winning at trial were greater than 0%, the plaintiff would have been
better off trying the case.
The funding arrangement discussed in Rancman concerned the
Working Group because it may have distorted the plaintiff’s settle-
ment-related incentives in a way that caused her to reject a value-
maximizing settlement opportunity.78  This is a real problem that can
also arise in cases where subrogors stand to receive portions of plain-
tiffs’ recoveries or where settlement payments are subject to third-
party liens.79  When interests in recoveries (or liability exposures) are
fractionated, the party controlling the settlement decision may find it
personally advantageous to reject a reasonable settlement, even
though this is not the jointly wealth-maximizing course.80  This is also
a problem that funders and plaintiffs should be strongly motivated to
address.  They suffer when value-maximizing settlement opportunities
are lost, so they should prefer working arrangements that enable them
to avoid loss-inducing conflicts.81
BNA) 56 (Jan. 30, 2013).  In another instance, a federal district court judge ruled that six women
who were sexually assaulted while serving prison sentences in Michigan owed $3.1 million of
their $3.5 million settlement to Money for Lawsuits, a funding company that advanced the
women $635,000 after they had won a $5.5 million jury verdict.  The verdict was later reduced to
$3.5 million.  Kathleen Gray, Advance-Payment Firm Could Get Most of Abused Inmates’ $3.5-
Million Settlement from State, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 17, 2012, http://www.freep.com/article/
20120417/NEWS06/204170389/.
77. The Rancman court may have meant to indicate that the plaintiff’s calculation would have
differed had she been required to reimburse the $6,000 payment in the event of a loss at trial.
That is correct, although to my knowledge, funders never require reimbursements.  She would
then have compared her portion of the $24,000 settlement offer to her share of the expected
recovery at trial, including the $6,000 repayment obligation discounted by the estimated odds of
losing the case.
78. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 27 (“On the assumption that $24,000 would other-
wise be a reasonable settlement offer, the presence of ALF seems to have an adverse impact on
the salutary goal of terminating litigation by settlement.”).  The Working Group also observed
that a different funding contract, one that tied the funder’s share to the duration of litigation,
could make a plaintiff too eager to settle. See id. at 27–28.
79. For a cogent account of subrogation, see Sebok, supra note 60.
80. A similar problem has been discussed extensively in the insurance context, where policy
limits fractionate exposure to liability risks. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1113 (1990); see also Charles Silver, A Missed Misalignment of Interests: A Comment on
Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 77 VA. L. REV. 1585 (1991).
81. Anthony Sebok informs me that funders attempt to avoid Rancman-like conflicts by limit-
ing their investments to a small fraction of the estimated value of plaintiffs’ claims.  This in-
creases the odds that plaintiffs will benefit by accepting reasonable settlement offers because
they (plaintiffs) participate in the gains.
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But the Working Group did not believe that fractionated interests
can create ethical problems for plaintiffs’ attorneys.  In its view, a
plaintiff’s decision to reject a settlement offer because her share of the
payment is too small differs in no important respect from a plaintiff’s
decision to reject an offer for any other reason.
If, in the lawyer’s judgment, the client would be better off rejecting
a settlement offer and going to trial, then the lawyer should inform
the client of this judgment . . . .  One of the factors relevant to the
client’s decision might be the obligation to pay the fee charged by
the [funding] supplier.  Other factors unrelated to the merits of the
lawsuit may be present as well, such as the client’s risk tolerance,
discount rate, need for funds, and preferences regarding a public
trial.  The presence of [litigation funding] is not different in kind
from the other factors that are part of virtually any decision to set-
tle; thus, they do not present distinctive ethical issues.82
It is certainly true that clients reject lawyers’ settlement recommenda-
tions for all sorts of reasons, and the Working Group’s assessment
may well be right.  That said, there is nonetheless a problem worth
examining.
In none of the examples listed by the Working Group does a client
reject a settlement offer while conceding that the offer is value-maxi-
mizing—i.e., that it is one that a person who owned 100% of the inter-
est in a claim would rationally accept.  Consequently, in all of the
examples, a plaintiffs’ attorney’s responsibility is consistent with the
lawyer’s desire to maximize the contingent fee.  Consider clients who
are risk-averse.  They are inclined to accept offers that are inadequate,
as are clients with high discount rates, urgent needs for funds, or
strong aversions to trial.  A plaintiffs’ attorney’s job when dealing with
these clients is to convince them to hold out for more money.  This
task is compatible with the lawyer’s fee arrangement, which rewards
the lawyer for maximizing the value of the claim.  Now consider risk-
preferring clients.  They will reject value-maximizing offers because
they find them insufficient.  Clients with low discount rates, little need
for money, or strong preferences for trials also want or think they de-
serve more than has been offered.  When dealing with one of these
clients, a plaintiff’s attorney must convince the client to be reasonable.
Again, this assignment is compatible with the lawyer’s fee arrange-
ment because reasonable action by the plaintiff will benefit the
attorney.
Fractionated interests create a different problem.  As mentioned,
they can motivate plaintiffs to reject reasonable offers while conced-
82. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 19, at 28.
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ing that the offers maximize the value of their claims.  In this situation,
by doing anything other than convincing the client to accept the offer,
a lawyer would reduce the expected fee.  In other words, by honoring
a funded client’s wish to take a flyer when only by winning big at trial
can the plaintiff pocket any money, a lawyer would have to expect to
do worse than if the case settled on the terms being offered.  If the
lawyer’s professional obligation is to do what is best for the client,
then the obligation and the fee arrangement, which punishes the law-
yer for trying the case, are at odds.
I find it hard to expect lawyers to fulfill their responsibilities in
Rancman-like situations.  Everything likely to influence their judg-
ment is wrong.  Having expended the time and borne the expenses
needed to obtain value-maximizing settlement offers, the clients’ deci-
sions to go to trial will leave the lawyers angry and disappointed.  The
clients’ desires will also saddle the lawyers with a risk of losing their
sunk costs and the unwelcome prospect of expending even more re-
sources with no reasonable expectation of a fee increase sufficient to
warrant the gamble.
Many lawyers will foresee the problems I have described.  The rest
will appreciate them after enduring a Rancman-like experience once.
One might therefore expect plaintiffs’ lawyers to obtain additional as-
surances that their clients will accept value-maximizing settlement of-
fers.  To accomplish this, they may change the terms of their
relationships with clients who receive third-party funding.  Perhaps
they will require these clients to pay higher fees after rejecting settle-
ment recommendations.  Or perhaps they will simply withdraw.
Of course, the matter is not all downside from plaintiffs’ lawyers’
point of view.  They may be compensated in advance for bearing the
conflicts third-party funding arrangements entail.  To see why, sup-
pose a lawyer handles ten funded cases, one of which generates a
Rancman-like problem and nine of which garner increased settle-
ments as a result of funders’ participation, which enables the plaintiffs
to hold out for better deals.  In the nine successful cases, the lawyer
earns larger fees.  In the one Rancman-like case, the lawyer is exposed
to a loss.  Does the participation of third-party funders make the law-
yer better off or worse off across all ten cases?  The answer depends
on facts that have not been set out, but if the lawyer agrees to handle
funded cases, one can reasonably infer that, in the lawyer’s view, the
expected gain exceeds the expected cost.
Insofar as lawyers are concerned, then, litigation funding has
plusses and minuses.  The most important issue is probably whether
lawyers are informed of third-party funders’ participation up front, so
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they can intelligently decide whether to accept or reject requests for
representation.  One supposes that lawyers will recognize the need for
this information and develop means to address it.  It seems likely that
funders will inform lawyers of their presence as well, if only to ensure
that they are paid before funds are disbursed to plaintiffs.
Finally, it is worth noting that insurance law deals with a problem
analogous to Rancman on the defense side by subjecting carriers to a
duty to settle.  Policy limits divide exposure to losses between carriers
and insureds.  Consequently, insurers can have incentives to reject
reasonable settlement demands at or within the limits.  After receiving
such a demand, an insurer may figure that it cannot lose much more at
trial (because the policy limits cap its exposure), but it will save a lot if
the jury finds in the defendant’s favor.  The rational course may there-
fore be to reject the settlement demand and take a flyer at trial.  The
duty to settle arose to motivate carriers to focus on the total trial ex-
posure, rather than just the portion they bear, when making settle-
ment decisions.83
One can imagine a similar duty arising on the plaintiff side in cases
involving third-party funders.  After rejecting a settlement offer un-
reasonably and losing at trial, a court would require the person who
made the decision to hold the other, and possibly the plaintiff’s attor-
ney, harmless.  Because only funders would have enough money to
make good on this responsibility, one might expect control to gravi-
tate in their direction.  A properly designed penalty would then en-
courage decisions based on expected trial recoveries, rather than
fractional shares of settlement payments.
A “hammer clause” is another possibility.  When a liability policy
contains a “consent to settle clause” that entitles a policyholder to
veto a settlement an insurer wants to accept, the insurer faces a risk of
incurring additional defense costs and a larger judgment-related loss
at trial.  In effect, a consent to settle clause enables a policyholder to
protect its own interests by saddling its insurer with greater risks.  Not
wanting its policyholder to be able to spend its money, an insurer will
therefore pair a consent to settle clause with a hammer clause that
puts the policyholder on the hook for post-rejection losses.84  “The
83. On the duty to settle, see Syverud, supra note 80.
84. A typical hammer clause might read as follows:
We will not settle any claim or “suit” without the first Named Insured’s consent.  How-
ever, if the first Named Insured refuses to consent to the settlement of such claims or
“suit” after first receiving our request for consent to settle, and the first Named Insured
elects to contest such claim or “suit” and continues legal proceedings for such claim or
“suit,” then our liability to pay damages under this policy will be the lesser of the
following:
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hammer clause has severe consequences for the insured,” including
responsibility for post-rejection defense costs, prejudgment interest,
and any payment to the claimant that exceeds the settlement de-
mand.85  With a hammer clause in place, a policyholder will veto a
carrier’s request to settle only when it “feel[s] very strongly about the
merits of the case, or about the message it sends to claimants.”86
By rejecting a settlement offer that a third-party funder wants to
accept, a plaintiff would force a funder to incur additional risks.  An
optimal funding contract would therefore encourage a plaintiff to re-
ject only offers that are not value-maximizing.  In theory, a hammer
clause could have this effect by forcing a plaintiff who rejects an offer
wrongly to bear the cost of the mistake.  A suitable clause will be diffi-
cult to design, however.  Only plaintiffs in commercial cases will have
enough money to indemnify third-party funders against post-rejection
losses.  Personal injury plaintiffs might be required to remit part of
their advances or to pay their funders additional compensation, but
both remedies will work imperfectly.  Many personal injury plaintiffs
will spend their advances shortly after receiving them.  Payment pen-
alties will also have little or no impact on plaintiffs in Rancman-like
situations.  After rejecting settlement offers, they will be insolvent
when they lose at trial (and, therefore, unable to pay penalties) and
when they win big, they will still be better off (because they will keep
part of the gain).
VIII. CONFUSION AND CONFLICTS
In the section of its report addressing the independent judgment
requirement, the Working Group also included a paragraph expres-
• up to and not to exceed the amount of damages set forth in our request to settle; or
• the limits of insurance (as set forth in § 19.7.1, Termination of the Duty to Defend).
Additionally, all further legal expenses, costs, and supplementary payments incurred by
an insured after the date of such refusal of the consent to settle will be the responsibil-
ity of such insured.
Joyce F. Frank & Lauren F. Goldberg, Insurance Coverage for Municipalities, in MASSACHU-
SETTS MUNICIPAL LAW § 19.4.9 (2d Supp. 2012); see also James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of
Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 32 (1999) (discussing the use of hammer clauses in
D&O insurance).
85. Frank & Goldberg, supra note 84, § 19.4.9.
86. Id.  D&O insurance policies, which give policyholders considerable control over settle-
ment, address the mirror-image problem that insureds may want to spend insurers’ money too
freely by entitling carriers to veto settlements recommended by policyholders. See Baker &
Swedloff, supra note 32, at 1426 (“The D&O policy also gives insureds significant control over
the settlement process, subject to the obligation to obtain the insurer’s consent.  As a result, the
insurer’s only protections against ex post moral hazard are the right to refuse to reimburse un-
reasonable defense costs and the right to refuse to consent to an unreasonable settlement.”).
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sing a series of conflict-related concerns stemming from confusion
over matters relating to the control of litigation:
Situations can be foreseen (and perhaps some cannot) in which the
interests of the [funding] supplier conflict[ ] with what the lawyer
perceives to be in the best interest of the client.  The existence of
the financing arrangement may sow confusion about who actually
owns the claim, who controls the lawsuit, the role (if any) of the
[funding] supplier participating in significant decision-making dur-
ing the litigation, and how to resolve conflicts between the client’s
directive, the [funding] supplier’s financial expectations, and the
lawyer’s assessment of the client’s best interests.87
It is certainly plausible that conflicts like these will arise.  Differences
regarding settlement decisions seem especially likely, if recent cases
provide a reliable guide.  In one instance, a client rejected her lawyers’
recommendation to accept a settlement because a litigation funder
would have received all the money.  After the case was tried and lost,
the lawyers, who did not know about the funding relationship, sued
the funder for tortious interference with the attorney–client relation-
ship.88  More generally, the possibility of conflicts between or among
plaintiffs, funders, and plaintiffs’ attorneys must be admitted freely.
While recognizing the potential for conflicts, one can nonetheless
wonder how often they will arise and how severe they will be.  On the
insurance side, interest conflicts have not proven to be so serious as to
warrant a prohibition on the sale of coverage or the joint representa-
tion of policyholders and carriers.  Conflicts arising in funded cases
may also prove to be manageable, especially over the longer haul.  Af-
ter conflicts arise in the first wave of funded cases, more efficient
working arrangements are likely to evolve.
Of course, efficient contract provisions may leave a good deal un-
said.  Consider liability contracts, billions of which are likely in force
at any given time.  The standard defense clause, a core policy provi-
sion, is simple.  It says that the insurer has the right and duty to defend
lawsuits seeking covered damages.  The standard settlement clause is
also brief.  It merely gives the carrier discretion to settle claims.  Other
87. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, White Paper on Alternative Litigation Financing 26 (Oct.
19, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/
20111019_draft_alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf (earlier draft of ABA WHITE PA-
PER, supra note 19).
88. Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450–51
(W.D.N.C. 2001); see also Gary Young, No Advance to the Rear: Litigation Financiers Have Been
Hurt by Ohio, North Carolina Rulings, but the Industry Shows No Sign of Disappearing, 78
MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV. 8, 10 (2003); cf. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW & ETHICS 146 (9th ed. 2012) (presenting examples of settlement-related con-
flicts connected to contingent percentage fees).
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provisions, such as the cooperation clause, are more detailed but are
also vague in important respects, such as whether a failure to cooper-
ate must prejudice a carrier before coverage can be withdrawn.  All
three provisions (and many others found in insurance contracts) have
spawned uncertainty and litigation, but no one sees this as a reason to
prohibit insurers from selling coverage or to prevent defense lawyers
paid by insurers from representing policyholders.
A learning process should also occur as a result of litigation.  With
third-party funding in its infancy, disagreements and planning failures
are to be expected.  The resulting disputes will slowly produce a body
of caselaw governing the enforceability and interpretation of funding
contracts.  Funders, plaintiffs, and lawyers will then adjust their work-
ing arrangements, expectations, and understandings in light of the in-
formation courts produce, and the frequency of disagreements should
decline.89
IX. TOO MUCH LITIGATION
A host of objections to third-party litigation funding contend that
enhancing plaintiffs’ access to capital will encourage litigation, with
deleterious consequences.90  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce es-
pouses this view.  It contends that third-party funding will enable law-
yers to file more frivolous cases and abusive class actions, prolong
lawsuits, and permit funders to instigate lawsuits that, but for their
prompting, would not be waged.91  Paul Rubin contends that third-
party funders, as repeat players with long-term interests in litigation,
will support expansive readings of tort law doctrines that will burden
society with costs not justified by the benefits they generate.92
Objections like these are empirical, and rigorous empirical study of
the impact of third-party funding is an infant industry.  Consequently,
nothing conclusive can be said at this time.  It is not even clear that
the theories said to support the allegations actually warrant them.
Consider the study by David Abrams and Daniel Chen that the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce cited to support its claim that third-party
89. This is the standard economic view of the information-producing function of courts. See
Charles Silver, Do We Know Enough About Legal Norms?, in SOCIAL RULES: ORIGIN; CHARAC-
TER; LOGIC; CHANGE 141 (David Braybrooke ed., 1996).
90. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Third-Party Financing of Litigation, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 673, 677
(2011) (“[T]he obvious effect of increased third party financing would be increased litigation,
where litigation refers to both the filing of cases and litigation of cases rather than settling.”).
91. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 61, at 10–14, 16–21.
92. Rubin, supra note 90, at 682–85.
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funding will encourage litigation.93  The first noteworthy aspect of the
study is that Abrams and Chen start from the premise that litigation is
undersupplied because tort victims cannot sell their claims.  The
Chamber, a partisan political group, does not mention the possibility
that enhanced access to funding may correct a shortage of litigation.
Second, when discussing the economics of litigation, Abrams and
Chen observe that third-party funding may not cause “an overall in-
crease in litigation.”94  To the contrary, settlement rates may “increase
. . . as defendants adapt[ ] to the involvement of third-party
funders.”95  Abrams and Chen further undermine the Chamber’s posi-
tion by noting, third, that funders prefer strong cases to weak ones.
Relying on other research, they noted that one funder would only in-
vest in cases with a 95% probability of winning, while another re-
quired a 50% chance.  Overall, funders “prefer[red] cases that [were]
likely to settle quickly, because the longer and more complex a matter
is, the greater [their] risk.”96  Fourth, in a possible riposte to Rubin,
they point out that “an additional benefit of litigation trading may be
clarification of the law. . . .  [P]reviously unaddressed legal questions
would arise and be resolved more quickly[,] . . . lead[ing] to more
efficient behaviors as parties make better-informed decisions.”97  One
might add that the questions should be serious ones, given the willing-
ness of third-party funders to expend the resources needed to raise
them.
Finally, and as the Chamber reported, Abrams and Chen’s empiri-
cal analysis of litigation in Australia found “a pattern of increased
funding corresponding to slower case processing, larger backlogs, and
increased spending by the courts.”98  But in their concluding remarks,
the authors were careful to limit the inferences that may properly be
drawn from this:
While congesting the courts may be a cost of third-party funding,
the overall welfare effects could still be positive.  If the value of the
adjudication of cases is greater than the expense of adjudicating
them, then third party [sic] funding should be encouraged.  Further,
court congestion may be a transitory effect of the entry of litigation
funders, and not one that persists.  The expectation would be that
once defendants recognize the increased likelihood of litigation and
93. David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third
Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075 (2013).  In its publication on third-party
financing, the Chamber of Commerce cited an earlier unpublished draft of this study from 2009.
94. Id. at 1079.
95. Id. at 1079–80.
96. Id. at 1088.
97. Id. at 1080.
98. Id. at 1103.
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the greater resources held by plaintiffs, they would be more likely to
settle in equilibrium.  While transitioning to that new equilibrium,
there is another potential benefit from litigation funding: earlier res-
olution of the law.99
Thus, although the Chamber concluded that third-party funding
should be prohibited, Abrams and Chen did not.
Although Abrams and Chen are the only researchers to have stud-
ied the impact of third-party funding empirically,100 others have devel-
oped economic models of parties’ incentives.  Their predictions often
differ, sometimes radically, from the Chamber’s dismal view.  For ex-
ample, Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum argue that opti-
mally sized nonrecourse loans will induce all cases to settle, as long as
funders refrain from controlling litigation.101  Roland Kirstein and
Neil Rickman model litigation with and without third-party contracts,
which may be entered into before or after settlement negotiations
start.102  They predict that, when the plaintiff and the funder contract
at the outset, settlement with the defendant is expected and will occur
on more favorable terms than the plaintiff would receive without the
funder’s assistance.  The plaintiff and the funder divide the expected
gain in settlement value, with the latter’s share representing the pre-
mium for the insurance provided against the risk of loss.
By focusing on litigation rates in courts, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce also ignores the possible impact the availability of funding may
have on primary conduct, which may be greater and more important
than its effects on lawsuits.  The easier access to justice becomes, the
greater the incentive potential wrongdoers should have to avoid im-
posing losses on others.  In other words, the likelihood of enforcement
should affect the rate at which people and businesses commit torts,
breach contracts, or act in other wrongful ways.  By enabling people
to assert claims who would otherwise sit on their hands, and by ena-
bling claimants to hold out for payments that more closely approxi-
mate the judgments they would receive at trial, third-party litigation
funding may create incentives that cause both the frequency of claims
and the rate of litigation to decline.  As Steven Garber observes,
99. Abrams & Chen, supra note 93, at 1106–07.
100. For a summary of empirical studies of fee arrangements, including contingent fees in the
United States, see Paul Fenn & Neil Rickman, The Empirical Analysis of Litigation Funding, in
NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE: A LEGAL, EMPIRICAL, AND ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 131 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010).
101. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Effect of Third-Party Funding of
Plaintiffs on Settlement (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 13-8,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2197526.
102. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, “Third Party Contingency” Contracts in Settlement and
Litigation, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 555 (2004).
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[I]f [alternative litigation funding] enables many individuals or orga-
nizations to strengthen their claims or to bring claims that they oth-
erwise would not bring, this could increase the costs to potential
defendants of activities that lead to claims and, as a result, decrease
behavior that causes or allegedly causes compensable harms.  Stated
simply, if [alternative litigation funding] increases deterrence of be-
havior that tends to lead to lawsuits, this effect will tend to reduce,
not increase, the volume of litigation.103
By focusing on litigation and diverting attention away from primary
behaviors that take place outside of courts, the Chamber may cause
readers to miss the forest for the trees.104
One really would like to appreciate the impact third-party funding
has on aggregate social welfare.  In theory, comparative studies could
shed light on its desirability overall, but the subject has not been stud-
ied quantitatively yet and years will likely pass before it is.  That said,
empirical studies do tend to show that countries with honest civil jus-
tice systems that permit private enforcement of legal rights tend to do
better than others economically.  Although access to justice imposes
significant costs on everyone involved, its benefits appear to be even
greater.105
X. CONCLUSION
Liability insurance is a fixture of civil litigation in the United States.
But it was once a new arrival.  According to the late Professor Gary
Schwartz, “Tort liability insurance seems not to have existed in this
country prior to 1886.”106  He added that, when “companies began
offering negligence insurance policies,” the legality of contracts that
insulated wrongdoers from the consequences of torts was
controversial.
A short series of judicial opinions proceeded to address the ques-
tion of whether the common law should give effect to these insur-
ance contracts.  The finale of this series—the Missouri Supreme
Court’s divided opinion in Breeden v. Frankford Marine Plate Acci-
dent & Glass Insurance Company [sic]—now serves as a standard
103. GARBER, supra note 8, at 29.
104. The history of the anesthesia patient safety movement bears out the suggestion that
claiming can drive improvements that lower error rates. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver,
The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or
Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 922 (2005).
105. Third-party funding may also have the potential to improve the quality of justice, if
courts would allow parties to admit funding agreements into evidence. See Ronen Avraham &
Abraham L. Wickelgren, Admissible Third Party Litigation Funding Contracts as a Way To Con-
strain the Exploitation of Plaintiffs 3 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper
No. 242, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986951.
106. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 314.
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citation for the conclusion that negligence liability insurance poli-
cies are legally proper.107
The legality of shifting the financial responsibility for torts to liability
carriers is now clear, even though some practices, such as insuring
against punitive damages, remain controversial.108
Third-party litigation funding is the new kid on the block, and its
potential to disturb existing litigation arrangements is clear.  It may
change litigation control arrangements on the plaintiffs’ side and force
plaintiffs’ attorneys to change their business models.  It may create
new interest conflicts that attorneys will have to identify and deal
with.  It may end the “good times” for liability insurers by forcing
them to compensate injured claimants more fully than they used to.  It
may vitalize claims that formerly would have been dormant, saddling
wrongdoers with additional costs and forcing them to show greater
concern for others’ legal rights.
Given the changes third-party funding may impel, the controversy
surrounding it is predictable.  Innovations that affect important work-
ing arrangements produce winners and losers, and the likely losers
routinely use whatever means, public and private, are available to in-
sulate themselves.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys seek ethics opinions from state
bar associations and the ABA.  Insurers and other repeat players on
the defense side pay think tanks, trade associations, and lobbyists to
attend legislative hearings, publish op-eds, and produce reports warn-
ing that the sky will fall.  And everyone uses the courts, especially
when innovations affect the delivery of legal services and the conduct
of civil litigation—matters over which judges claim extensive authority
and special expertise.
Such campaigns sometimes stop innovations in their tracks,109 but
one suspects that third-party litigation funding is here to stay.  The
basic driver in the consumer litigation sector is that injured claimants
need the money third-party funders provide.  One suspects that judges
and other policy makers, recognizing the legitimacy of victims’ desires,
will leave open channels for them to get the support they need.  In the
commercial litigation sector, there is cause for optimism because busi-
107. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Breeden v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins.
Co., 119 S.W. 576 (Mo. 1909)).
108. See, e.g., Janet R. Davis & Gary L. Gassman, The Ins and Outs of Employment Practices
Liability Insurance Coverage and Claims, BRIEF, Winter 2013, at 22, 29 (“Policies now often
include coverage for punitive damages, which may be awarded under discrimination statutes.
However, the availability of coverage generally is still subject to a jurisdiction’s public policy
regarding the insurability of punitive damages.”).
109. See Silver, supra note 64, at 820–23 (discussing the successful campaign by defense law-
yers to prevent liability insurers from using third-party fee auditors).
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nesses will be divided and because the law tends to let sophisticated
parties contract as they please.  Any business could find itself short on
funds or reluctant to bear all the risks of litigation when acting as a
plaintiff.  Consequently, businesses may not want to cut off access to
third-party funders entirely.  And intelligent regulators should see no
greater need to protect businesses from third-party funders than from
banks, investors, or other sources of capital.
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